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Executive Summary 
1. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 
created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, which replaced the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. By federally funding programs for needy 
families in the form of block grants, PRWORA severed the link between state and federal spending 
on cash benefits. In addition, PRWORA gave states unprecedented flexibility to create new cash 
assistance programs for families with children. This paper presents a preliminary assessment of the 
impact of welfare reform on caseload growth in South Carolina. 
2. AFDC originated during the Depression as part of the 1935 Social Security Act. The incentive to 
work for many AFDC recipients was low in part because benefits were reduced dollar for dollar 
with earnings. The incentive to save was also low because families on welfare could not accumulate 
more than $1,000 in assets or own a vehicle worth more than $1,500. The hope is that under 
PRWORA, which allows states to set income and asset limits, it can be determined which combina-
tion of incentives is best able to reduce welfare dependency. 
3. Highlights of welfare reform included time limits, changes in asset, limits, and family cap provi-
sions. 
Time Limits. PRWORA forbids states from using TANF funds to aid families that include an adult 
who has received 60 months of TANF benefits. As seen in Table 1, South Carolina and Georgia 
implemented limits stricter than those required by PRWORA. 
Table 1. Time Limits in the Carolinas and Georgia 
                                              Short Run Time Limit     
Lifetime 





 South Carolina  24 Out of 120 Months 60 Months Yes  Oct.-96
 North Carolina 24 Out of 60 Months 60 Months Yes  Jul. 96; Jan. 97
         Georgia  48 Months 48 Months Yes  Jan.-97 
              
 
    
      
                                  
                                                                   
Work Requirements. Under PRWORA, states must require parents or other caretakers to engage in 
work-related activities after no more than 24 months of aid. Table 2 shows work requirements and 
sanctions in the Carolinas and Georgia. 














 SC No 100% 1 mo. after compliance 100% 1 mo. after compliance
 NC Yes  $50 3 months $75 12 months
 GA Yes  25% 1 month 100% Lifetime
South Carolina requires work when the individual is “determined able to engage in work,” while 
North Carolina and Georgia require TANF recipients to engage in work-related activities immedi-
ately. South Carolina imposes a 100 percent reduction in benefits for failure to comply with its work 
requirements. North Carolina imposes longer sanction lengths, but relatively low benefit reductions. 
Georgia has a comparatively mild minimum sanction, but the most severe maximum sanction. 
Asset Limits. PRWORA gives states the authority to set asset limits, including the use of TANF 
funds to create Individual Development Accounts, a restricted savings account that allows individu-
als to accumulate savings to be used for postsecondary education, home ownership, and business 
capitalization. These limits are shown in Table 3. Taken as a whole, South Carolina’s asset limits are 
among the highest in the nation. 
Table 3. Asset Limits in the Carolinas and Georgia 
T A N F A F D C 
Asset 
Limit 








South Carolina $ 2,500 $ 10,000 $ 1,000 $ 1,500 $ 10,000
 North Carolina $ 3,000 $ 5,000 $ 1,000 $ 1,500 n/a
    Georgia  $ 1,000 $ 4,650 $ 1,000 $ 1,500 $ 5,000 
Family Caps. Under AFDC, welfare benefits automatically increased whenever the family grew in 
size. Under PRWORA, states have the option of setting limits on payments without regard to 
family size. South Carolina has not implemented a family 
cap. Benefits increase by $41 per month for each additional child (provided as a voucher). By 
contrast, North Carolina and Georgia have implemented family caps. 
4. PRWORA contains incentives for states to reduce their welfare caseloads and help families 
make the transition from welfare to work. To receive their full TANF block grant, states must 
achieve minimum work participation rates, beginning at 25 percent in FY 1997 and rising by five 
percentage points per year, reaching 50 percent in FY 2002 and after. Because states have pecuni-
ary incentives to reduce caseloads, any reduction in caseloads is due to a combination of changes 
in behavior of welfare recipients and program administrators. It is difficult to separate the two 
because researchers typically observe only the behavior of welfare recipients. 
5. The number of welfare cases in the U.S. fell from 4.98 million in FY 1994 (1.92 cases per 100 
persons) to 3.13 million (1.16 cases per 100 persons) in FY 1998, a decline of 37 percent 
(see Figure 1). 
6. Relative to the nation, welfare participation has historically been, and continues to be low in 
South Carolina (see Figure 2). South Carolina’s FY 1998 caseload was 15th-lowest in the nation. 
North Carolina’s FY 1998 caseload was 1.02 per 100 persons (28th lowest) and Georgia’s was 1.03 
per 100 persons (31st lowest). 
7. Caseloads in South Carolina fell from 1.42 cases per 100 persons (51,925) in FY 1994 to 0.66 
cases per 100 persons (25,293) in FY 1998, a decline of 54.2 percent. The 54.2 percent decline in 
South Carolina’s caseload was 10th highest in the nation. North Carolina’s decline of 45.6 percent 
was 22nd highest and Georgia’s decline of 49.1 percent was 16th highest (see Figure 3). 
8. Adjusted for inflation, welfare benefits declined between 1990 and 1997 by 21 percent in South 
Carolina (7th largest decline in the nation), by 19 percent in North Carolina, and by 16.5 percent in 
Georgia. The median maximum welfare benefit for a family of three in January 1997 was $377. 
South Carolina $200 benefit was 6th lowest in the nation (see Figure 4). North Carolina’s benefit 
was $272 (10th-lowest) and Georgia’s was $280 (11th lowest). South Carolina’s welfare benefit was 
about 11.6 percent of the earnings of full-time workers in manufacturing, lower than either North 
Carolina (14.3 percent) or Georgia (14.4 percent). Differences across states in FY 1998 welfare 
caseloads were strongly positively related to welfare benefits. 
9. Caseloads varied greatly across South Carolina counties (see Figur  5). For the first seven 
months of FY 1999, the median county caseload was 0.5 per 100 people, ranging from 0.2 cases 
per 100 persons in Pickens County to 1.2 cases per 100 people in Clarendon County. Caseloads 
tended to be higher in counties with higher rates of unemployment, lower average levels of educa-
tion, and higher average welfare stipends per case. 
10. Regression analysis on county level, annual data for South Carolina revealed that caseloads 
rise by: 
a. 3.5 percent for each percentage point increase in the unemployment rate; 
b. 2.5 percent for each 10 percent increase in welfare benefits; 
c. 1.2 percent for every 10 percentage point decrease in average SAT scores; 
d. 16.5 percent for every 10 percent decrease in median household income. 
11. The estimated effects of SAT scores may appear to be small, but it must be kept in mind that 
better educated students earn higher incomes. Income had an extremely large negative effect on 
welfare caseloads. Indeed, because education is one of the few variable most under the control of 
policy makers, it should receive high priority. 
12. Regression analysis using county level monthly data for South Carolina yielded slightly 
smaller estimated effects of unemployment, but significantly larger estimated effects of stipends. 
Each 10 percent increase in welfare stipends was estimated to increase caseloads by 6.2 percent. 
13. I estimated that welfare reform reduced caseloads in South Carolina by about one third. This 
was very close to the effect estimated by Wallace and Blank (1999) for the U.S. as a whole (also 
using monthly data). Again, it must be kept in mind that this decline is a result of changes in 
behavior on the part of both welfare recipients and welfare administrators. More research is neces-
sary to separate out these effects. 
14. Although welfare reform appears to be a resounding success, enthusiasm may need to be 
tempered for a number of reasons. The most important one is that the economy is growing faster, 
and unemployment is lower, than at any time since the middle 1960s. The real test of welfare 
reform – both of recipients and of our resolve as a nation to stay with reform — is the next reces-
sion. Nor is it yet clear whether welfare reform has had other desirable effects, such as reducing 
teen pregnancy or the number of households headed by single women. Put differently, the reduc-
tion in caseloads since 1996 is a necessary, rather than a sufficient condition, for the long-run 
success of welfare reform. 
A. Introduction 
On August 22, 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) was enacted. This Act created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
block grant, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In 
addition to severing the link between State and Federal spending on cash benefits and work-related 
services for needy families with children (Ways and Means 1998, p.495), PRWORA gave states 
unprecedented flexibility to create new cash assistance programs for families with children 
(Gallagher et. al. 1998). 
PRWORA is only the most recent legislation reforming the welfare system. In 1988 Con-
gress passed the Family Support Act, which required states to extend AFDC to two-parent families 
(AFDC-UP) if they had not already done so, and required that at least one parent in recipient fami-
lies participate in a work or educational program (Stapleton et. al. 1997).1  In the early and mid-
1990s, several states obtained and implemented waivers to federal rules under Section 1115 of the 
Social Security Act. These waivers included imposing work requirements, the introduction of family 
cap provisions, elimination of the 100-hour work limitation rule for UP families, and elimination of 
the work history requirement for UP families (Stapelton et. al. 1997, I.3). 
This paper presents a preliminary assessment of the impact of welfare reform on caseload 
growth in South Carolina. The limited scope of my analysis must be emphasized. Because South 
Carolina implemented its reforms in late 1996, I can only examine trends in the short- and medium-
term. A more complete assessment of welfare reform, including analysis of labor supply, school 
attendance, child-bearing, and marital arrangements, would require much more data and time. The 
current paper can, however, hopefully serve as a useful backdrop against which to frame future 
analysis. 
The outline of this monograph is as follows. In Section B, I give a brief overview of the 
history of the original AFDC program. I then describe the changes to the welfare system that were 
passed into law in the PRWORA. Section C describes recent trends in welfare caseloads, along with 
presenting a fairly extensive comparison of those trends across states. Section D examines the 
generosity of welfare payments across states, and how those payments have evolved over time. 
Section E briefly reviews three recent studies that have attempted to estimate the impact of welfare 
reform on welfare caseloads. Section F contains an extensive analysis of trends in welfare caseloads
both over time and across South CarolinaÕs 46 counties, as well as econometric estimates of the 
effect of welfare reform on caseloads. Section G explores some potential avenues of research. 
Section H offers some concluding thoughts about the future of welfare reform. 
1 In addition, Medicaid and Child Care programs were expanded. 
 
B. The Welfare System 
1. The System Prior to Reform 
This section draws heavily from Gary Burtless (1990), who outlined the structure of the 
pre-reform welfare system in the United States. This system consisted of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), General Assistance, the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), and several forms of in-kind transfers: food stamps, Medicaid, and 
housing and energy assistance (p. 58).1 The EITC dates to 1976 and is managed as part of the 
federal income tax system. Medicaid and food stamps began in the early 1960s. 
The focus of this paper is the AFDC/TANF program, the largest single cash program for the 
poor (Burtless, p. 61). This program originated during the Depression as part of the 1935 Social 
Security Act, and was jointly administered by the federal and state governments to provide benefits 
to families containing needy children. Before the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, about 
half of the states restricted participation to families in which one parent Ð usually the father Ð was 
absent or incapacitated. The Family Support Act, passed in 1988, required all states to offer AFDC 
benefits to poor two-parent families.2 
Although subsidized by the federal government, AFDC benefit levels were determined by 
state legislatures. As a result, there was substantial variation over time and across states in the value 
of those benefits. State legislatures were responsible for setting the basic support level. There was a 
benefit reduction rate associated with the AFDC program. For every dollar earned, whether in the 
labor market or otherwise, AFDC benefits fell at a certain rate. Initially, the nominal benefit reduc-
tion rate was 100 percent. This means that for every dollar earned, benefits fell by a dollar. The 
benefit reduction rate was reduced to 67 percent in 1967 (Burtless, p. 63). In 1981, Congress 
changed the tax treatment of earnings under AFDC, essentially restoring the 100 percent nominal 
benefit reduction rate that had been in effect before 1968, although recipients were subject to the 67 
percent rate for the first four months of earnings.3 
There is an inevitable tension between providing assistance to the needy and maintaining 
incentives for recipients to work sufficiently hard that they no longer require assistance. Many 
observers felt that AFDC succeeded in the first objective but failed in the second. The incentive to 
1 Burtless pointed out that large numbers of poor and near-poor families benefited from social insurance programs that
also serve affluent families: Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and workmenÕs compensation. 
2 Provided that the primary earner was unemployed or working fewer than 100 hours per month. 
3 In fact, the story is more complex. Before 1981 AFDC recipients could deduct $30 for up to 12 months, but one-third 
of earnings for only four months (Moffitt 1992, p. 10, footnote 6). Burtless (1990) noted that in calculating the amount 
of earnings to be counted against benefits, welfare caseworkers usually deducted expenses deemed necessary for work, 
including income and payroll taxes, transportation and child care costs, and special food and clothing expenses. In fact, 
the effective AFDC tax rate on earnings was probably less than 50 percent before the reforms of 1967, and below 25
percent by 1971 (Burtless, p. 63). Similarly, the reforms of 1981 were accompanied by a Ògradual tightening of
administrative procedures,Ó raising the effective rate to 70 percent in 1982 (Burtless, p. 64). 
 
was indeed low. Because benefits were reduced dollar for dollar with earnings, welfare recipients 
faced among the highest effective tax rates in the United States. The incentive to save was low 
because families on welfare could not accumulate more than $1,000 in assets, or own a vehicle 
worth more than $1,500. Although welfare benefits (adjusted for inflation) declined throughout the 
1980s, recipients seemed unable or unwilling to leave the program. For these reasons, many ob-
servers believed that the system had to be redesigned from the ground up. 
2. The Reformed System 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. TANFÕs 
basic block grant entitles the 50 states and District of Columbia to a total of $16.5 billion per year of 
federal funding through fiscal year 2002 (Ways and Means 1998 p.503).1  Before TANF, the federal 
government reimbursed states for about 55 percent of total welfare-related expenditures (Ways and 
Means 1998, p. 510). By federally funding programs for needy families in the form of block grants, 
PRWORA severed the link between state and federal spending on cash benefits and work-related 
services.2 
TANF grants were based on past spending (FY 1992-1995) on programs for needy families. 
Three formulas were applied to determine the size of the grant, and the formula that resulted in the 
largest grant was applied. South Carolina has received, and will continue to receive through 
FY2002, nearly $100 million per year in Federal family assistance grants (Ways and Means 1998, 
Table 7-40, p. 504). This represents a $5.57 million increase relative to FY 1996, an increase of 
about five and one-half percent. By contrast, North Carolina receives $302.2 million, a decrease of
$10.4 million Ð more than 3 percent Ñ relative to FY 1996. Georgia, on the other hand, receives 
$330.7 million annually, an increase of $42 million over its spending in FY 1996.3 
1 Specifically, each stateÕs basic grant equals the sum of Federal payments for AFDC, Emergency Assistance, and Jobs 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) in recent years. 
2 However, there are provisions for extra funding for states with high rates of population growth, high and increasing 
unemployment rates (Ways and Means 1998, p. 509), and increased food stamp caseloads. 
3 This increase reflects, in part, supplements for high population growth and below-average federal spending per poor 
person in FY1994. 
3. Highlights of the Reforms 
PRWORA allows states great discretion in designing their cash assistance programs. Under 
TANF, states continue to set benefit levels. In contrast to AFDC, TANF allows states to set asset 
and income eligibility limits, as well as eligibility of two-parent families. However, there are a 
number of limits on the use of federal funds for cash assistance. For example, states may not use 
federal dollars to provide benefits for unwed mothers under 18 or their children unless they live 
under adult supervision, or to unwed mothers under 18 without a high school diploma unless they 
attend school (Ways and Means 1998, p. 496). Other limitations on the use of federal TANF funds 
include a time limit on the receipt of TANF funds and work-triggers.
Gallagher et. al. (1998) reviewed in detail statesÕ implementations of welfare reform. It is 
useful to highlight the changes implemented in South Carolina, and compare them with the changes 
implemented by North Carolina and Georgia. 
Time Limits. Perhaps the most controversial provision of PRWORA, states may not use 
TANF funds to aid families that include an adult who has received 60 months of TANF benefits. 
States are also permitted to implement stricter limits. Although states may use their own funds to 
provide benefits to individuals beyond the federally mandated time limits, only Michigan and 
Vermont have chosen to do so. 
Table B.1 shows the time limits implemented in South Carolina, along with the implemen-
tation date. South Carolina enacted limits stricter than required by PRWORA, limiting families to 
24 months of assistance every ten years. Georgia implemented a lifetime limit of just four years on 
public assistance. All three states terminate benefits for families that reach the state time limit. 
Table B.1. Time Limits in the Carolinas and Georgia 










24 Out of 120 
Months 
60 months Termination Oct-96 
North Carolina 
24 Out of 60 
Months 
60 months Termination Jul. 96; Jan. 97 
Georgia 48 Months 48 Months Termination Jan-97 
Exceptions to Time Limits. States are permitted to exempt certain families up to 20 percent of
their caseload from federally mandated time limits. Table B.2 shows the exceptions imple-
mented in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. 


















South Carolina Yes Yes No No No Yes 
North Carolina Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 




South Carolina will extend benefits for up to 12 months if no work is available provided that the 
beneficiary complies with a self-sufficiency plan, or for up to 6 months upon completing an ap-
proved training program.1  North Carolina will extend benefits on a month-to-month basis, provided 
that the person complies with a personal responsibility contract, or is unable to comply for good 
cause, and cannot find work. 
Work Requirements. Under PRWORA, states must require parents or other caretakers to 
engage in work-related activities after no more than 24 months of aid.2 Table B.3 shows work 
requirements and sanctions in the Carolinas and Georgia. 










Min. Length, Most 
Severe Sanction 
SC No 100% 1 mo. after compliance 100% 1 mo. after compliance 
NC Yes $50 3 months $75 12 months 
GA Yes 25% 1 month 100% Lifetime 
South Carolina does not have a hard and fast immediate work requirement, instead requiring TANF
recipients to work when they are Òdetermined able to engage in workÓ or within 24 months, which-
ever is sooner.1  By comparison, North Carolina and Georgia require TANF recipients to engage in 
work-related activities immediately upon receiving benefits. South Carolina imposes a 100 percent 
reduction in benefits for failure to comply with relatively milder work requirements. North Carolina 
imposes a relatively long sanction length, but reduces benefits by only $50 per month.2  Georgia has 
a comparatively mild minimum sanction, but the most severe maximum sanction.3 
Income Eligibility Limits. Prior to AFDC, recipients were subject to two income eligibility 
tests. PRWORA allows states to design their own income eligibility tests. As was the case under 
AFDC, income eligibility limits become stricter as time on welfare progresses. Table B.4 shows 
these limits for the Carolinas and Georgia for the first month and thirteenth month of earnings. 
Neither North Carolina nor Georgia changed their limits, while South Carolina increased their 
limits by $20. 
1 The 6-month limit may be extended with the express permission of the county director. 
2 Although states must require participation in community service after 2 months of aid, they were permitted to opt out. 
Roughly 20 States did so (Ways and Means 1998, p.497). In addition, states may exempt singe parents caring for 
children under one year of age. 
1 Information on immediate work requirements was from TANF Report to Congress, Table 9.1, part a. 
2 Specifically, the reductions are: 1st instance of noncompliance, $50 for three months; 2nd instance, $75 for three 
months; 3rd instance, $75 for six months; subsequent instances, $75 for 12 months (Gallagher et. al. 1998, Table A.2. 
3 Specifically, continued noncompliance after three months or the second instance of noncompliance in 24 months will 
result in the termination of benefits for life (Gallagher et. al. 1998, Table A.2). 
Table B.4. Income Eligibility Limits in the Carolinas and Georgia 
TANF AFDC 
1st Month of 
Earnings, Oct. 1997 
13th Month of 
Earnings 
1st Month of 
Earnings, Jul. 1996 
13th Month of 
Earnings 
South Carolina $930 $630 $910 $610 
North Carolina $940 $630 $940 $630 
Georgia $760 $510 $760 $510 
Income eligibility limits are similar in South and North Carolina, but much lower in Georgia. 
Income eligibility levels decline between the first and thirteenth month by $100 in South Carolina, 
by $110 in North Carolina, and by $150 in Georgia. 
Asset Limits. Under AFDC, families were not permitted to acquire more than $1,000 in 
assets, although there was an exemption for a vehicle worth up to $1,500. In addition to allowing 
states to change these limits, PRWORA gives states the authority to use TANF funds to create 
Individual Development Accounts, a form of restricted savings account that allows individuals to 
accumulate savings to be used for postsecondary education, home ownership, and business capitali-
zation. These limits are shown for the Carolinas and Georgia in Table B.5. 
Table B.5. Asset Limits in the Carolinas and Georgia 
TANF AFDC 
Asset Limit Vehicle Limit Asset Limit Vehicle Limit Restricted Saving Acct. 
South Carolina $ 2,500 $ 10,000 $ 1,000 $ 1,500 $ 10,000 
North Carolina $ 3,000 $ 5,000 $ 1,000 $ 1,500 n/a 
Georgia $ 1,000 $ 4,650 $ 1,000 $ 1,500 $ 5,000 
South CarolinaÕs asset limits are among the highest in the nation. Although its asset limit of $2,500
is $500 lower than North CarolinaÕs $3,000 limit, South Carolina allows recipients to save up to
$10,000 in a restricted savings account. In addition, South CarolinaÕs vehicle limit of $10,000 is
double that in North CarolinaÕs, and more than double GeorgiaÕs $4,650 limit. 
As noted earlier, there is an inevitable tension between providing public assistance to the
needy and maintaining incentives to work and succeed. Even in light of this tension, AFDCÕs asset
limits may have been counterproductive. An automobile Ñ a necessity in most regions of the
United States Ñ worth only $1,500 is unlikely to provide reliable transportation to individuals for 
whom reliability is probably their most valuable asset. 
Family Caps. Under AFDC, welfare benefits automatically increased whenever the family 
grew in size. Under PRWORA, by contrast, states have the option of setting limits on payments 
without regard to family size. Only two statesÐ Idaho and Wisconsin Ð set a flat benefit regardless 
of family size. In most states, initial benefits are higher for larger families, but do not increase if the 
family grows. Table B.6 shows how the maximum TANF benefit varied by family size in the 
Carolinas and Georgia in July 1997. 
Table B.6. Maximum TANF Benefits by Family Size, July 1, 1997 
Initial Family Size of: Increased benefits for 
additional kids under 
TANF?1 2 3 4 5 6 
South Carolina $119 $159 $200 $241 $281 $322 Yes (voucher) 
Increment $ 40 $ 41 $ 41 $ 40 $ 41 
North Carolina $181 $236 $272 $297 $324 $349 No 
Increment $ 55 $ 36 $ 25 $ 27 $ 25 
Georgia $155 $235 $280 $330 $378 $410 No 
Increment $ 80 $ 45 $ 50 $ 48 $ 32 
Benefits are lower in South Carolina than in North Carolina or Georgia. However, South Carolina 
has not implemented a family cap. Benefits increase by $41 per month for each additional child 
(provided as a voucher). By contrast, North Carolina and Georgia have implemented family caps. 
4. Penalties and Incentives for States 
PRWORA contains incentives for states to reduce their welfare caseloads and help families 
make the transition from welfare to work. To receive their full TANF block grant, states must 
achieve minimum work participation rates, beginning at 25 percent in FY 1997 and rising by five 
percentage points per year, reaching 50 percent in FY 2002 and after (Ways and Means 1998, p. 
498).1  States that fall short of the required participation rate will have their TANF block grant 
reduced by five percent for the first failure, rising by two percentage points each year, with a 
maximum penalty of 21 percent in any one year (Ways and Means 1998, p. 499). 
States also must maintain a level of historic spending, typically 75 percent of FY 1994 
spending on programs replaced by TANF (the so-called Maintenance of Effort requirement). In 
addition, penalties are imposed on states for failure to comply with child support enforcement 
requirements, uphold the five-year TANF limit on benefits, or maintain aid for a single parent who 
1 Mandated participation rates for two-parent families start at 75 percent in FY1997-98 and rise to 90 percent in FY 1999 
and after. 
cannot obtain care for a child under six years of age.
PRWORA provided up to $400 million over four years to states that reduce out-of-wedlock 
birth rates and abortion rates below FY 1995 levels (Ways and Means 1998, p. 509). The five
states with the greatest annual decline in out-of-wedlock birth rates will receive a bonus of $20 
million, provided they also reduce the abortion rates. Finally, PRWORA provided $1 billion for
fiscal years 1999-2003 to reward so-called Òhigh performanceÓ states. Although performance 
criteria were not set at the time Ways and Means (1998) was published, DHHS was considering 
four measures: employment, job retention, earnings progression, and birth rates of females be-
tween the ages of 15 and 17. 
5. Discussion 
Because states have pecuniary incentives to reduce caseloads, the reduction in caseloads 
that has occurred since 1996 (discussed in the next Section) is due to a combination of changes in 
behavior of welfare recipients and program administrators. It is difficult to separate the two be-
cause researchers typically observe only the behavior of welfare recipients. This is not a minor 
point. Research found that welfare recipients under AFDC were only mildly sensitive even to 
relatively large changes in incentives including work and schooling requirements and benefit 
reduction rates (Moffitt 1992). The steep declines in welfare caseloads that have occurred are 
therefore unlikely to be solely due to the response of welfare recipients to changes in the welfare 
program. 
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C. Trends in Welfare Caseloads and Recipients 
1. National Trends 
Table C.1 contains data on welfare caseloads and recipients for the 50 states and District of 
Columbia, by fiscal year, between 1983 and 1998. The number of cases hovered around 3.5 mil-
lion between 1983 and 1989, rose sharply in the early 1990s to nearly 5 million, and fell between 
1994 and 1998. The most dramatic declines occurred between 1996 and 1998, by which time the 
number of cases fell to just over 3 million, fewer than in 1975. The trend in recipients was similar. 
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1983 10,466,822 3,593,151 233,260,107 4.49 1.54 
1984 10,676,775 3,667,038 235,316,674 4.54 1.56 
1985 10,629,560 3,635,146 237,399,072 4.48 1.53 
1986 10,810,095 3,690,959 239,580,611 4.51 1.54 
1987 10,878,217 3,727,023 241,749,909 4.50 1.54 
1988 10,734,300 3,690,825 243,946,467 4.40 1.51 
1989 10,741,175 3,711,007 246,239,168 4.36 1.51 
1990 11,263,460 3,913,002 248,783,842 4.53 1.57 
1991 12,390,695 4,310,886 251,455,230 4.93 1.71 
1992 13,943,414 4,917,959 257,058,207 5.28 1.85 
1993 14,032,535 4,984,521 259,653,454 5.42 1.91 
1994 14,032,535 4,984,521 259,653,454 5.40 1.92 
1995 13,485,122 4,822,313 262,146,020 5.14 1.84 
1996 12,476,379 4,497,308 264,583,583 4.72 1.70 
1997 10,785,295 3,896,069 267,105,145 4.04 1.46 
1998 8,632,790 3,133,708 269,659,792 3.20 1.16 
Figure C.1 shows the number of welfare cases per 100 persons. Between 1983 and 1989, 
there were roughly 1.5 families on welfare for every 100 people in the nation. Caseloads rose to 
just over 1.9 families per 100 people by 1994 and then fell to just over 1.1 cases per 100 people by 
1998. The trend in recipients per 100 persons (not shown) was similar. From 4.5 recipients per 100 
people between 1983 and 1989, the number of recipients rose to 5.5 per 100 people by 1994, and 
fell to just over 3 recipients per 100 people by 1998. 
 
2. Welfare Caseloads and Recipients Across States 
There is considerable geographic variation in welfare participation. Figure C.2 shows 
welfare cases per 100 persons for FY 1998 for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. South 
Carolina had the 15th lowest welfare caseload with 0.66 cases per 100 persons, compared with a 
national average of 1.16 cases per 100 persons. North Carolina and Georgia, with 1.02 and 1.03 
cases per 100 people, were just above the median (28th and 31st lowest, respectively). 
Table C.2 shows the same data organized by region, and sorted by caseload within 
region. Within the South Atlantic region, only Virginia, with its highly skilled population and 
booming economy around the D.C. metropolitan area had a lower caseload than South Carolina. 
With more than four families on welfare for every 100 persons, Washington, D.C. had the 
highest welfare caseload in the nation. It was followed by California (2.17 cases per 100 per-
sons), Rhode Island (1.95), and New York (1.85). The states with the lowest caseloads were 
Idaho (0.15 cases per 100 persons, or 1.5 per thousand persons), Wyoming (0.26 per hundred 
persons), and Wisconsin (0.28 per hundred). 


3. Evolution of Caseloads in the Carolinas and Georgia 
Figure C.3 and Table C.3 show how caseloads evolved over time in the Carolinas and Georgia 
between FY 1983 and 1998. 
There were 1.5 cases per 100 persons in South Carolina in 1983, about the same as Georgia. 
Caseloads in South Carolina declined between 1983 and 1989. Caseloads in North Carolina and 
Georgia fell between 1983 and 1985. Caseloads in all three states rose in the recession of 1990-
91, and fell as the economy strengthened in 1994. The decline in caseloads accelerated in all three 
states after the passage of welfare reform in 1996. 

4. The Decline in Caseloads Between 1994 and 1998 
Figure C.4 shows the percentage decline in annual average caseloads between FY 1994 
and 1998 for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
The decline in South Carolina, 53.4 percent, was 10th highest in the nation. North Carolina (45.6 
percent, 22nd highest) and Georgia (49.1 percent, 16th highest) were not far behind in absolute terms. 
The largest declines by far were in Wisconsin (81.5 percent), Idaho (80.3 percent), and Wyoming 
(78.6 percent). By contrast, caseloads fell by only 14.6 percent in Rhode Island, 15.0 percent in 
D.C., and 18.0 percent in Hawaii. 
5. What is Responsible for the Decline in Caseloads? 
It is tempting to link the acceleration of the caseload decline after 1996 to welfare reform. 
However, it is difficult to assess the impact of welfare reform based on graphs such as the one 
shown in Figure C.3. The decline in welfare caseloads between 1994 and 1998 coincided with 
highest rates of economic growth and the lowest rates of unemployment since the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, the effects of economic prosperity operate with a lag. Part of the decline in welfare 
caseloads in 1997 and 1998 were due to improvements in the economy as far back as 1995 and 
1996. Also, states implemented welfare reform differently at various points in time. 
At least part of the decline in welfare caseloads was due to declining (inflation-adjusted) 
welfare benefits. For this reason, it is worth examining trends in welfare payments. It is also help-
ful to put welfare benefits in perspective. They have never been particularly generous in an abso-
lute sense and, indeed, have been declining in real value since the middle 1980s. A comparison of 
benefits across states is also valuable in understanding how the generosity of welfare benefits 
affects caseloads. 
4. The Decline in Caseloads Between 1994 and 1998 
Figure C.4 shows the percentage decline in annual average caseloads between FY 1994 and 1998 
for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
The decline in South Carolina, 53.4 percent, was 10th highest in the nation. North Carolina (45.6 
percent, 22nd highest) and Georgia (49.1 percent, 16th highest) were not far behind in absolute 
terms. The largest declines by far were in Wisconsin (81.5 percent), Idaho (80.3 percent), and 
Wyoming (78.6 percent). By contrast, caseloads fell by only 14.6 percent in Rhode Island, 15.0 
percent in D.C., and 18.0 percent in Hawaii. 
5. What is Responsible for the Decline in Caseloads? 
It is tempting to link the acceleration of the caseload decline after 1996 to welfare reform. 
However, it is difficult to assess the impact of welfare reform based on graphs such as the one 
shown in Figure C.3. The decline in welfare caseloads between 1994 and 1998 coincided with 
highest rates of economic growth and the lowest rates of unemployment since the mid-1960s. 
Moreover, the effects of economic prosperity operate with a lag. Part of the decline in welfare 
caseloads in 1997 and 1998 were due to improvements in the economy as far back as 1995 and 
1996. Also, states implemented welfare reform differently at various points in time. 
At least part of the decline in welfare caseloads was due to declining (inflation-adjusted) welfare 
benefits. For this reason, it is worth examining trends in welfare payments. It is also helpful to put 
welfare benefits in perspective. They have never been particularly generous in an absolute sense 
and, indeed, have been declining in real value since the middle 1980s. A comparison of benefits 




D. The Generosity of Welfare Payments 
1. Benefits in 1997 
The generosity of welfare benefits varies enormously across states. I collected data on the 
maximum monthly benefit for a one-parent, three-person (that is, two-child) family for various 
years.1 Figure D.1 shows benefits by state for January 1997. Table D.1 shows the same data 
sorted by region, and sorted by benefit level within each region. The median benefit was $377, 
ranging from a low of $120 per month in Mississippi to a high of $923 in Alaska. The benefit in 
South Carolina of $200 was 6th lowest in the nation, lower than North CarolinaÕs benefit of  $272 
(10th lowest) and GeorgiaÕs benefit of $280 (11th lowest). 
1 These data are from The 1998 Green Book, available at http://www.house.gov/ways-means/publica.htm 

 
2. Trends in Welfare Benefits, 1980-1997 
Table D.1 also shows welfare benefits for 1980, 1985, and 1990. Between 1990 and 1997, 
the median benefit increased by only $13. Benefits were unchanged in fourteen States, including 
North Carolina, and fell in nine others, including South Carolina. Benefits increased by only $7 per 
month in Georgia. As a result, inflation, although low by historical standards, eroded the real value 
of welfare benefits substantially. The right-hand side of Table D.1 shows real (inflation-adjusted) 
benefits in 1997 dollars for various years. The real median benefit fell by 15.7 percent between 
1990 and 1997. The largest declines occurred in California (34 percent), Michigan (28 percent) 
and Maine (25 percent). Benefits declined by 21 percent in South Carolina (7th largest decline in 
the nation), by 19 percent in North Carolina, and by 16.5 percent in Georgia. 
4. Benefits Relative to Earnings in Manufacturing 
Comparing welfare benefits across states is complicated by regional differences in the cost 
of living and labor market productivity. I therefore calculated benefits in each state as a percentage 
of the earnings of full-time workers in manufacturing, shown in Figure D.2.1 The median benefit 
was 17 percent of earnings in manufacturing, but varied enormously across states. Alaska paid a 
relative benefit of 47 percent, followed by Hawaii (33 percent), Vermont (30 percent), and Rhode 
Island (29 percent). Relative benefits in South Carolina were 11.6 percent of manufacturing earn-
ings, lower than in either North Carolina (14.3 percent) or Georgia (14.4 percent). 
Table D.2 shows how relative welfare benefits evolved over time. The median welfare 
benefit fell from 24 percent of manufacturing earnings in 1980 to 21 percent by 1985. Between 
1990 and 1997, relative welfare benefits gradually declined to 17 percent in 1997. Relative welfare 
benefits fell in South Carolina from 14.7 percent in 1985 to just 11.6 percent in 1997. The pattern 
was similar in North Carolina. Relative benefits rose in Georgia from 16.5 to 17.9 percent between 
1985 and 1990, but had fallen to 14.4 percent by 1997. 
1Specifically, I collected data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on average hourly earnings in manufacturing in each 
state (http://www.bls.gov/). I assumed that full-time workers work 40 hours per week for 50 weeks per year, or 2000
hours per year. Monthly earnings were obtained by dividing annual earnings by 12. The relative welfare benefit was




5. Including the Value of In-Kind Benefits 
Although a comprehensive valuation of in-kind benefits is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is worth examining the effect of adding in the value of food stamps.1 Figure D.3 shows the 
combined value of food stamp and welfare benefits in the 50 states and District of Columbia in 
January 19972 
1 PRWORA retained AFDCÕs eligibility limits for the use of Medicaid, and TANF recipients not living with others 
automatically become eligible for food stamps (Ways and Means 1998, p. 503). Many TANF families also live in
subsidized housing. In FY 1995, 8 percent of AFDC families lived in public housing, and 14.5 percent received a 
HUD or other rent subsidy (Ways and Means 1996, Table 7-26). 
2 Food stamp benefits were much more uniform across states than welfare benefits, paying $315 in most of the 
contiguous 48 states. Although food stamp benefits were below $300 per month in a number of states, these states
tended to have above-average welfare payments. 
Table D.3 shows the data sorted by region. The combined monthly benefit was $515 in 
South Carolina, $587 in North Carolina and $595 in Georgia, well below the median combined 
monthly benefit of $692. The monthly benefit ranged from a low of $435 in Mississippi to a high 
of $1,246 in Alaska. The figure for Alaska is an outlier, however. The highest benefits in the 
contiguous 48 States were paid in Vermont ($877), Connecticut ($875), and New York ($863). 
Figure D.4 shows the combined welfare and food stamp benefit relative to earnings in 
manufacturing (also shown in Table D.3). The median combined benefit was 32 percent of manu-






How much of the variation in welfare caseloads across states is due to variation in welfare 
benefits? I graphed FY 1998 welfare caseloads as a function of the combined welfare and food 
stamp monthly benefit for the 50 states.1  I examined this relationship using benefits measured 
both in absolute levels, shown in Figure D.5a, and relative to manufacturing, shown in Figure 
D.5b. Each graph also contains the line of best fit.2 
In both cases, caseloads were strongly positively related to welfare benefits. However, it is 
easily seen that the line fits the data better in Figure D.5a than in Figure D.5b. The objective 
statistics also support this contention. Variation in the absolute level of benefits explains 19 
percent of the variation in caseloads across states, while variation in relative benefits explains only 
12 percent of the variation. 
Of course, benefits are not the only determinant of caseloads. Wallace and Blank (1999) 
pointed out that because the real value of AFDC benefits fell between 1985 and 1990, AFDC 
caseloads should have declined. The rise in caseloads that occurred instead is all the more puz-
zling because unemployment rates fell and median wage rates rose between 1985 and 1989. The 
stubborn persistence of welfare caseloads may help explain why so many observers felt that 
AFDC had to be replaced. It is therefore appropriate to turn our attention to three papers that 
examined the impact of welfare reform. 
1 I deleted Washington, D.C., an extreme outlier. This had no impact on the basic conclusions 





E. Estimating the Impact of Welfare Reform
 I focus on three recent econometric studies of welfare caseloads that analyzed the effects of 
welfare reform, either as a result of PRWORA or 1115 waivers prior to its passage. 
1. Stapleton et. al. (1997) 
Stapleton et. al. (1997) estimated models for caseload growth using quarterly data on a 
panel of states over the 1982-1996 period. Highlights of their findings included the following. 
1. They found very large effects of the unemployment rate on caseload growth. A one-
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate was estimated to raise basic 
caseload growth by 26 percent in the long run. 
2. Welfare benefits had large, positive effects on caseloads. A 10 percent increase in the 
average monthly benefit was estimated to increase caseloads by 2.7 percent after one 
year. 
3. Declines in marriages and increases in non-marital births were strongly correlated with 
(basic) caseload growth.1 
4. Although only a few states had implemented Section 1115 waivers during the period 
they studied, they found that states that had implemented family caps reduced caseloads 
by 2.5 percent. 
Unfortunately, the models estimated by Stapleton et. al. (1997) are not directly comparable 
to those estimated by other researchers.2 Although they contended that their estimates were still 
useful for analyzing which factors contribute to caseload growth, some of their results Ð for ex-
ample, the extremely large effect of unemploymentÑmay be a result of their approach.3 
1 The direction of causality, however, is an open question. 
2 Specifically, their dependent variable was not welfare participation in a given state at a given time, but welfare 
participation adjusted for expected participation based on national trends. 
3 The authors admitted that the complexity of their model Òmay diminish the ability of policy makers and others to
understand and use the findingsÓ (III.C.2). 
2. Rector and Youssef (1999) 
Rector and Youssef (1999) analyzed the percentage reduction in state welfare caseloads 
between January 1997 and June 1998. Their analysis focused on the effect of work requirements. 
Specifically, they examined whether caseloads fell by more in states that had immediate work 
requirements and implemented stronger sanctions for failing to meet work requirements. To mea-
sure the severity of sanctions, Rector and Youssef used Burke and GishÕs (1998) classification 
scheme in which states were divided into four groups: initial full-check sanction, delayed full-
check sanction, moderate sanction, and weak sanction. States with an initial full-check sanction 
have the option of terminating TANF payments at the first instance of non-performance or non-
compliance. Delayed full-check sanction states terminate benefits only after a period of noncom-
pliance. Moderate sanction states may reduce benefits by a third or more, and weak sanction states 
only terminate the adult portion of the TANF check (p. 3). 
Rector and Youssef (1999) estimated that states imposing initial full sanctions experienced 
24.8 percent larger declines in welfare caseloads compared with weak-sanction states, followed by 
delayed full sanction states (13.7 percent) and moderate sanction (11.3 percent) states. 
There are several difficulties with their study. First, although they controlled for unemploy-
ment, it was statistically insignificant, and even more problematic, had the wrong sign.1  Second, 
their methodology was different from that used by other authors. Specifically, they examined the 
percentage reduction in welfare caseloads between January 1997 and June 1998. It is very difficult 
to adequately control for the effects of economic conditions using data at only two points in time.2 
Finally, they did not examine the effects of other differences in welfare policy across states, instead 
focusing exclusively on work requirements. For these reasons, further research would seem to be 
necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
1 Specifically, they included as a regressor the average rate of unemployment in the State over the 18-month period 
they examined. The perverse estimated effect was statistically significant at the 13 percent level, which suggests that 
their model is misspecified. 
2 Because the population of welfare recipients is small in most states, relatively minor events can have relatively large 
effects on the percent change in welfare caseloads. In addition, welfare caseloads have strong seasonal components in
many states that are not necessarily identical (e.g., Montana and Florida). Third, the effects of economic conditions
tend to operate with long Ð up to two years or more Ñ and variable lags. 
3. Wallace and Blank (1999) 
Wallace and Blank (1999) estimated the relationship between caseload changes, overall 
economic prosperity, and the implementation of AFDC waivers that allowed states to run experi-
mental welfare programs prior to the 1996 welfare reform legislation. Their study utilized state-
level data at both annual and monthly frequencies. The annual data were for the period 1980-
1996, and their monthly data were for the period 1980-1998. Their findings included the follow-
ing. 
1. A one-percentage point increase in unemployment increases caseloads by between 4 
and 6 percent. This effect, much smaller than that estimated by Stapleton et. al., is 
closer to that estimated by other researchers. 
2. A 10 percent increase in the median wage is associated with a decline in caseloads of 
between 3 and 6 percent. 
3. States with higher levels of education had lower AFDC caseloads. 
4. Increased (maximum) AFDC benefit levels are associated with higher caseloads. Each 
10 percent increase in benefits is associated with an increase in caseloads of between 2 
and 5 percent. 
5. Each one percentage point increase in the proportion of non-marital births is associ-
ated with about a one percent increase in AFDC caseloads. 
6. The election of a Republican governor is associated with a decline in AFDC caseloads 
of between 4 and 6 percent. 
7. The results using annual data indicate that States that implemented welfare waivers 
experienced declines of between 4 and 10 percent in their caseloads. The estimates 
using monthly data indicate that waivers reduced caseloads by between 28 and 35 
percent. 
4. Discussion 
Estimating the effects of welfare reform on welfare caseloads is problematic for several 
reasons. First, the data requirements are substantial. The effects of economic factors Ð unemploy-
ment, for example Ñ are arguably better estimated using monthly data, especially if one is inter-
ested in sorting out short-run from long-run effects. However, data on many demographic vari-
ables Ðimmigration, race, and age structure Ð are available only at an annual frequency. Second, it 
is tricky to estimate the effect of certain  demographic trends Ñ for example, divorce and 
birth rates to single teens Ð on welfare caseloads because the direction of causality is not 
always clear. Put simply, do higher divorce and teen birth rates cause caseload growth, or do 
factors that contribute to caseload growth cause higher divorce and teen birth rates? 
Finally, it is difficult to sort out the behavior of program participants from that of program 
administrators. Stapleton et. al. (1997) and Wallace and Blank (1999) could not sort out whether 
states that implemented welfare reform experienced greater caseload reductions because of 
greater willingness of welfare participants to work, or because caseworkers exerted greater effort 
to move recipients into the labor market. The sanction classification scheme used by Rector and 
Youssef is arguably a better way to separate the incentive for welfare recipients to find work from 
the incentive of administrators to reduce welfare rolls. Even their approach, however, is not 
immune from criticism. States more dedicated to reducing their welfare caseloads may have 
implemented stricter work requirements. 
Despite their problems, the studies are useful. For one, it may not be essential to know 
exactly how welfare reform is working. As long as no important variables omitted from the 
model, unbiased estimates of the effects of reform can be obtained by comparing states with 
various levels of reform. Fortunately, Wallace and Blank (1999) found that excluding demo-
graphic factors from models of caseload growth had little effect on the estimated effects of 
economic factors or welfare reform. 
In the next Section, I implement the approach of Wallace and Blank (1999) to estimate 
the effects of welfare reform on welfare caseloads using data from South CarolinaÕs 46 counties. 
Although I used a relatively small number of variables in my analysis, the results of Wallace and 
Blank (1999) suggest that my estimates should not be too far off the mark. 
F. Estimating the Impact of Welfare Reform in South Carolina 
In this section, I estimate the impact of welfare reform in South Carolina. First, however, I 
examine patterns of welfare participation across South CarolinaÕs 46 counties. In addition to 
providing a useful overview of the data, they shed light on factors that help explain differences in 
welfare caseloads across the state. 
1. Trends in Caseloads 
Figure F.1 shows welfare caseloads per 100 persons for the fiscal years 1993 (red bars) 
and 1999 (blue line). The median caseload rate in 1993 (McCormick and Newberry Counties) was 
about 1.5 cases per 100 people, and ranged from 0.5 (5 cases per thousand people) in Pickens 
County to 4.2 in Allendale County. Between 1993 and 1999, welfare participation plummeted in 
every county. By 1999, the median caseload was 0.5 per 100 people, and ranged from 0.2 cases 
per hundred people in Pickens County to 1.3 cases per hundred people in Clarendon County. 
 
Counties with higher welfare participation in 1993 tended to have higher participation in 
1999. However, the variation in welfare participation declined markedly. For example, in 1993, the 
highest welfare participation rate (Allendale, 4.2 cases per 100 people) was eight times the lowest 
(Pickens, 0.5 cases per 100 people). In 1999, the highest welfare participation rate (Clarendon, 1.3 
cases per 100 people) was only 6.5 times higher than the lowest (Pickens, 0.2 cases per 100). 
To illustrate this convergence, I divided counties into five groups based on their average welfare 
caseload between 1993 and 1999. The first group contained the nine counties with the lowest 
average caseloads, the second group contained the nine counties with the next-lowest caseload 
rate, and so on. I then calculated the average caseload rate in each group of counties in each year.1 
The results are shown in Figure F.2. 
The convergence in caseload rates is easily visible in Figure F.2. Caseloads in the highest group 
fell from about 3 per 100 persons to a just more than 1 per 100 persons between 1993 and 1999. 
Caseloads in the lowest group fell from just under 1 per 100 people in 1993 to 0.25 per 100 in 
1999. 
1 These were unweighted averages. 
2. Differences in County Welfare Caseloads: A Graphical Analysis 
Caseloads and Unemployment. Researchers have estimated a significant relationship 
between economic conditions and welfare caseloads. To examine this relationship across South 
CarolinaÕs 46 counties, I collected data on the average unemployment rate in FY 1999 (through 
July). I sorted the counties by unemployment rate, and graphed both the unemployment rate and 
FY 1999 welfare caseloads per 100 persons on the same graph, shown in Figure F.3. In addition, I 
have drawn a trend line (using ordinary least squares) through welfare caseloads (the straight 
black line). Notice that this trend line has a positive slope, indicating that counties with higher 
unemployment rates tended to have higher welfare caseloads as well. 
Although the relationship between unemployment and welfare caseloads is 
strongly positive, a question of interpretation arises. Unemployment rates Ð especially in 
the cross section Ðmeasure the vitality of the economy not only on the demand side, but 
on the supply side as well. Less skilled individuals are more likely to be unemployed, for a variety 
of reasons.1 
Caseloads and Education. I collected data on the percentage of the population (in 1990) 
with less than a ninth grade education. I sorted counties by education level and graphed education 
level along with welfare caseloads for FY 1999, in F gure F.4. Again, I have drawn a trend line 
through welfare caseloads. As can be seen, this trend line has a strongly positive slope, indicating 
that counties with lower levels of skill had higher welfare caseloads. 
1According to one theory, layoffs are less likely among those whose labor input is a less variable factor. For example 
managerial employees may be needed even if when output is temporarily below its normal level. Such individuals 
tend to be more skilled. However there are competing explanations. First, the returns to work (that is, earnings) are 
lower for less skilled individuals. Higher unemployment could be capturing the effects of such differences. According
to another theory, individualsÕ labor supplies are very responsive to changes in the demand for labor demand. When 
demand falls, this theory argues, individuals withdraw from the labor market rather than accepting wage reductions. 
Caseloads and Welfare Stipends. Welfare stipends are primarily a function of family size, but also 
depend on the labor market earnings of recipients as well as income exclusions, which are deter-
mined by caseworkers. I collected data by county on the average monthly stipend per case for FY 
1999 (through July). I sorted the counties from low to high and graphed the average stipend, along 
with welfare caseloads per 100 workers, in Figure F.5. 
The monthly real welfare stipend per case (in 1997 dollars) varied from $89 (McCormick County) 
to $111 (Abbeville County). As can be seen by the positively sloped (straight) trend line, caseloads 
were higher in counties with higher average welfare stipends. 
In summary, we have found welfare caseloads to be positively related to the rate of unem-
ployment, negatively related to the level of education, and positively related to the average wel-
fare payment. However, these variables are not independent of one another. To sort out these 
effects, as well as others, is best done using regression analysis, to which we now proceed. 
 3. Regression Analysis Using Annual Data 
To conveniently summarize patterns in the data, I estimated a regression model in which 
the dependent variable was the natural logarithm of welfare cases per 100 persons. I estimated the 
model for the calendar years 1994 through 1999.1  For explanatory variables, I tried including the 
three variables we have already examined: the average annual rate of unemployment, the percent 
of the population with less than a ninth grade education, and the natural logarithm of the average 
monthly welfare stipend. I added the following additional explanatory variables: the percentage of 
the population that was 65 years old or older (in 1990), median household income (in 1989), and 
an indicator for whether the county was in a metropolitan area. Finally, I included dummy vari-
ables for year to pick up the effects of welfare reform, which went into effect in mid-1997. 
The results are contained in Table F.1. Because I could not obtain reasonable estimates of 
the effects of education, I used average SAT scores as a proxy.2 
1 I was missing caseload data for January 1994. This will have little impact on the estimates. The data for 1999 were 
through July. 
2 Despite the strong negative relationship between education and caseloads shown in Figure F.4, I consistently 
obtained negative (partial) effects of education on caseloads. The problem arises because education is highly corre-
lated with unemployment and median household income. Entering two highly correlated variables in a regression
model can often result in an exaggerated estimated effect of one variable in the ÒrightÓ direction and a large estimated
effect in the ÒwrongÓ  direction of the other. 
 
 
The estimated effect of unemployment was similar to that estimated by Wallace and Blank 
(1999) when they used annual data. Each percentage point increase in unemployment was associ-
ated with a 3.5 percent increase in welfare caseloads per 100 persons. Each 10 percent increase in 
welfare stipends was associated with a 2.5 percent increase in caseloads. Not surprisingly, coun-
ties with larger elderly populations had lower caseloads. Nor was it surprising that counties in 
metropolitan areas, with their greater labor market opportunities, also had much lower caseloads, 
other things the same. 
Each additional 10-point increase in average SAT was estimated to reduce the welfare 
rolls by 1.2 percent. This is important because aside from welfare stipends, this is the one variable 
at least partly under the control of policy makers. 
The year effects capture variations in caseloads over time that are not explained by the 
variables included in the model. If one interprets the estimated coefficients on the year effects 
since 1997 as due to the effects of welfare reform, the results are large indeed. According to these 
estimates, caseloads in 1997 were 21.7 percent lower than they otherwise would have been as a 
result of welfare reform. The estimated effects of welfare reform were even larger in 1998 and 
1999: 42.3 and 37.0 percent, respectively. These effects were much larger than those obtained by 
Wallace and Blank (1999).1 The year effects could be capturing some variable left out of the 
model. It is, however, difficult to think of variables that could account for such a steep decline 
over such a short period of time.2  One possibility is that the model did not have adequately 
controlled for the effects of the economic expansion on welfare caseloads. One way to improve 
on this is to estimate a model using monthly data, to which I now turn. 
4. Regression Analysis Using Monthly Data 
I estimated caseload regressions using monthly data in South CarolinaÕs 46 
counties for the period between February 1994 and July 1999. Due to a combination of 
1 They estimated three models using the annual data, obtaining estimated effects of welfare reform of 4, 7, and 10 
percent. The lowest estimate was obtained in a model that included state-specific time trends. These variables will
tend to soak up much of the estimated effects of welfare reform. The highest estimate was obtained in a model that
included only unemployment as an explanatory variable. The remaining model included controls for a wide variety of 
demographic and political variables. 
2 I did not include county fixed effects because this would have made it impossible to estimate most of the effects 
included, which do not vary over time within a county. Moreover, deleting these variables and including county fixed
effects the estimated year effects were even larger. I emphasize the more conservative estimates, which were more
consistent with the results obtained using monthly data. 
 
time and data constraints, the model was fairly sparse. Fortunately, the effects esti-
mated here should not be much affected by the variables left out of the model. 1  The depen-
dent variable was the percent change in welfare caseloads per person in a given county in a 
given month. The explanatory variables included: 
1. Current and 24 lagged changes in unemployment rates at the county level; 
2. Month of the year to control for seasonality; 
3. A fixed effect (dummy variable) for each county. The county effects control for factors 
associated with a county that do not vary over time (or vary only slowly), including 
education, age structure, and median income; 
4. Current and 6 lagged changes in average welfare stipend per caseload at the county 
level, by month; and 
5. Current and 20 lagged changes in welfare waivers.2 
The results are shown in Table F.2. 
The estimated effects of unemployment were again similar to those obtained by 
Wallace and Blank (1999). Each percentage point increase in unemployment was esti-
mated to increase welfare caseloads by about 3.0 percent. Each 10 percent increase in 
the real welfare stipend was estimated to increase caseloads by 6.2 percent, a 
1 It is unlikely, for example, that the adoption of welfare reform was due to unusually large increases in the flow of 
immigration or divorce. Wallace and Blank (1999) found that including such variables usually had only minor effects 
on the estimated effects of the other variables. 
2 I tried including current and lagged changes in real wage rates in manufacturing at the state level. However, the 
estimated coefficients on wages were unrealistically large. I therefore omitted the variable from the analysis. Closer 
examining revealed that there was simply insufficient variation in manufacturing wages over the period I studied to 
obtain meaningful estimates. The wage data were at the state level and not the county level. This means that the 
effects were identified entirely based on time-series variation. Real wages in manufacturing declined steadily between 
1993 and 1997 from about $11.20 per hour (in 1997 dollars) to $10.60, and were virtually flat between 1997 and 
1999. The problem of estimating relationships when there is insufficient variation is well known. When one uses data 
on all states (such as Wallace and Blank 1999), cross-section variation helps identify the effects of wages on 
caseloads, even over relatively short time periods. 
considerably larger effect than I estimated using the annual data (see Table F.1). Finally, 
welfare reform was estimated to have reduced caseloads by 33 percent. This estimate was in the 
same ballpark as obtained by Wallace and Blank (1999) in their monthly analysis (their estimates 
ranged from 28 to 35 percent). 
5. Assessing the Effect of Welfare Reform 
How much of the decline in caseloads in South Carolina can be attributed to welfare 
reform? Between 1994 and 1998, caseloads in South Carolina fell from 51,925 to 25,293, or by 
about 51 percent (see Table C.3). One might begin by asking how much welfare rolls would have 
declined if nothing else had changed other than the rate of unemployment. Over this period, the 
unemployment rate fell from 6.3 to 3.8 percent, or by 2.5 percentage points. The monthly results 
imply a 7.5 percent decline in cases (a decline of 3,894) to 48,031. Over the same period, welfare 
benefits declined by 23, implying an additional decline of 14.3 percent (of 48,031) or 6,868. The 
impact of these two factors combined is a decline of 10,762 cases to 41,163. The actual decline 
was 26,632, so trends in unemployment and welfare benefits explain roughly 40 percent of the 
actual decline of 26,632. This leaves an unexplained decline of 15,870. 
What if neither unemployment nor welfare stipends had changed? The model predicts that 
caseloads would have declined by about one third (of 51,925), or 17,135. This is very close to the 
unexplained decline of 15,870. Relative to the initial caseload level of 51,925, the estimates 
suggest that welfare reform can account for between 31 and 33 percent of the caseload decline. 
6. Final Remarks 
Policy makers have a limited number of tools to reduce welfare caseloads below their 
current level. Welfare benefits are lower than at any time in recent history. Benefits would have 
had to fall by 48 percent (monthly analysis) to have the same impact as welfare reform. The most 
important variable under the control of policy makers is education. This is particularly important 
in South Carolina, which continues to lag the nation in this area. It might appear that welfare 
caseloads are relatively insensitive to changes in SAT scores. However, smarter children earn 
higher incomes, which have a powerful negative effect as well. In the long run, education is 
clearly one key. 
 
G. Suggestions for Future Research 
A number of other important issues are associated with welfare reform. 
1. Nutrition 
According to a report by the Department of Agriculture, The number of people receiving 
food stamps fell by over 5.9 million between the summers of 1994 and 1997, with most of the 
decline occurring between September 1996 and September 1997 (USDA 1999). Although this 
decline occurred during a period of strong economic growth, the USDA reported anecdotal 
evidence Ð increased demand for assistance at food pantries and soup kitchens Ñ that some 
people leaving welfare may not realize that they remain eligible for food stamps. Because nutri-
tion is so crucial to the physical, mental, and intellectual development of children, special atten-
tion may need to be devoted to ensure that families leaving welfare are aware of all of their 
options.1 
2. Economic Development and Residential Mobility 
Despite a state average unemployment rate of 4 percent through July 1999, unemployment 
exceeded 10 percent in several counties. The old welfare system may have had the undesirable 
side effect of reducing the incentive of individuals to move out of declining communities. An 
important topic for future research is to examine the impact of welfare reform on residential 
mobility of individuals in less prosperous communities. 
3. Wealth Formation 
The new welfare law allows states to set asset limits, including the setting up of restricted 
savings accounts. South Carolina allows individuals to accumulate up to $10,000 in such an 
account. The incentive to take advantage of such accounts is limited because the use of funds is 
restricted to purchase of post-secondary education or a home. However, the prospect of being 
allowed to save for a new home could be of interest to individuals on public assistance, particu-
larly those who live in public housing. 
1 Wallace and Blank (1999) found that the implementation of Section 1115 welfare waivers was negatively correlated
with food stamp utilization. They speculated that food stamp recipients Òmay experience some of the same demon-





4. Family Size and Strucutre 
Most states continue to pay higher initial welfare benefits to larger families. Family cap 
provisions do, however, prevent welfare benefits from increasing to families already receiving 
welfare benefits. Whether such caps indeed reduce the incentive of young single mothers on 
welfare to bear additional children is an open question. Such caps may also have unintended 
consequences. A report by Rutgers University estimated that New JerseyÕs family cap law resulted 
in 240 more abortions per year for poor women.1 Although no one case study can be conclusive, 
family caps do seem to reduce the incentive of young single women on welfare to care for their 
unborn children. Whether such caps reduce unwanted pregnancies Ð either through abstention or 
more careful birth control Ð is an important topic for future research.2  Family caps may also give 
young women a greater incentive to develop stable family relationships.3 
5. Less-Skilled Labor Markets 
As a result of welfare reform, large numbers of less-skilled individuals have entered the 
labor market. Without a correspondingly large increase in demand, this places downward pressure 
on the wage rates of less-skilled workers. An important topic for future research is to examine 
whether these effects can be detected in the data. Second, the ability of less-skilled individuals to 
find work may be hampered by increases in the minimum wage. The question arises whether the 
transition from welfare to work was more difficult in states that have set minimum wages above 
that mandated by federal law. Finally, federal welfare reform legislation forbids payment of TANF 
funds to non-high school graduates under 18 years of age unless they are enrolled in school. An 
important topic for future research is to determine whether the law has reduced the number of high 
school dropouts. 
1 ÒFamily Cap Increases Abortions,Ó http://www.wcla.org/. 
2 Teen birth rates declined by 16 percent from 1991 to 1997 Ð the sixth year in a row that the teen birth rate declined 
(HHS News Release, http://www.hhs.gov). Separating out the effect of welfare reform from this trend will be 
particularly important. 
3 Although welfare has been blamed for the rise in the number of single female-head households in the U.S., other
forces Ð for example, no-fault divorce Ñ are at work. A number of studies were carried out in the 1980s found 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. However, it appears that the magnitude of the estimated effects were too small 





H. Concluding Remarks 
A large body of research suggests that tinkering with the old system was unlikely to 
reduce substantially the number of people on the welfare rolls.1 According to Moffitt (1992), ÒAn 
extraordinarily low percentageÓ of female heads of household on AFDC worked Ð never more 
than 18 percent between 1968 and 1987, and only 6 percent in 1987 (p. 11). Moreover, the labor 
supply of female heads of household was relatively insensitive to changes in AFDC benefit levels, 
benefit reduction rates, or benefit-earnings ratios. Moffitt concluded, ÒThis extreme inelasticity 
does not augur well for the prospect of increasing work effort by any change in benefits or ben-
efit-reduction ratesÓ (p. 13). 
Thus far, welfare reform appears to be a great success. In the TANF Report to Congress, it 
was reported that 31.5 percent of single mothers who had received AFDC in the previous year 
were working in March 1997, up from 25 percent in 1996, 21 percent in 1993, and 19 percent in 
1992.2 A study of individuals who left welfare in South Carolina found that 59 percent were 
working six months after leaving the program. A similar Maryland study found 51 percent of all 
welfare leavers had worked in the first quarter, and 42 percent in each of the three quarters after 
going off welfare. Moreover, all 50 states and the District of Columbia met the overall work 
participation requirement for all families in 1998, the first full year of the welfare reform law. 
Fully 23 percent of recipients were employed, compared to less than 7 percent in 1992 and 13 
percent in 1997.3 
The exhilaration may need to be tempered, for a number of reasons. First, welfare reform 
has been in effect for too short a time for the five-year lifetime limit to have become binding. 
Second, the nation is experiencing the fastest rate of economic growth since the early 1960s. The 
next recession will test the resolve of the nation to continue the reforms. However, it may not be 
necessary to wait until the next recession. Bill Bradley, Democratic candidate for President, has 
vowed to repeal welfare reform if elected. This would appear to be an overreaction, but it is only 
prudent to prepare for the inevitable difficulties before they  occur. 
1 MoffittÕs (1992) analysis of the incentive effects of the old U.S. welfare system included a comprehensive review of 
the empirical literature. 
2 Table 3.2. 
3 The success is not unqualified. A number of states, including North Carolina, failed to meet the two-parent partici-
pation rate. Such states may either submit corrective plans or appeal the penalty. 
Most people laid off in a recession turn to unemployment insurance (UI) for income 
security. However, UI may not provide a sufficient cushion for those at the low end of the skill 
distribution.1  Most state UI programs replace less than 50 percent of earnings for a maximum of 
26 weeks whereas welfare benefits may be received for up to two years in most states.2  Moreover, 
individuals on welfare automatically become eligible for food stamps and Medicaid. Research is 
needed to understand how best to administer benefits to those who are at risk of going on welfare 
when the economy enters a downturn, and how to help those who turn to welfare find work when 
the recession ends. 
1 If there is a stigma attached to receiving welfare, individuals may choose UI if the dollar difference in benefits is not 
too large. 
2 In South Carolina, individuals may receive welfare benefits for up to 24 months in any 10-year period. 
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